Motivated by applications in social networks, peer-to-peer and overlay networks, we define and study the Bounded Budget Connection (BBC) game -we have a collection of n players or nodes each of whom has a budget for purchasing links; each link has a cost as well as a length and each node has a set of preference weights for each of the remaining nodes; the objective of each node is to use its budget to buy a set of outgoing links so as to minimize its sum of preference-weighted distances to the remaining nodes.
INTRODUCTION

Motivation
You are the campaign manager for a Presidential candidate and it is the start of what will be a long and grueling series of primaries and caucuses to determine your party's nominee. You have a limited budget for the campaign, in terms of money and time. And, you need to understand the (organized as well as informal) networks of connections and influence that exist within the nation to decide how best to allocate your scarce resources so as to have the optimal impact on voters. Many of the players and political operatives you choose to reach out to are not only being courted by other candidates but also have their own ambitions (maybe at the regional or town levels) and agendas. Your actions affect and, in turn, are affected by the actions of the others, voters and candidates, in the race. In the world of ever shifting political loyalties you need to understand the calculus of allegiance: what should you do and who should you ally with so as to effectively counteract and neutralize the strategies of your opponents while maximizing your chances of winning the required votes?
You are the founder of a social networking website, such as a friend finder site or a site where people trade timeshares on vacation homes. Your income from the site depends on how well people are connected to one another. The more easily they can find others to befriend, the more money you make. People have natural bounds on their time and cognitive resources and hence are limited in the number of people with whom they can maintain direct ties (also known as the Dunbar limit in the sociology literature). They must rely on friends of friends, and friends of friends of friends and so on to reach other people in the network. It is no surprise that you are concerned with understanding how the structure of networks generated by individuals expressing their natural preferences and aversions will affect your ability to monetize the network. Could it be possible that left to their own devices people will generate poorly connected networks?
You are designing the next killer application, the next Napster, the next Kazaa, the next big thing in the world of unstructured peer-to-peer file sharing networks or overlay networks. You know that people will hack the open source reference implementation of the client to create nodes that will behave strategically, selecting their first hop neighbors to selfishly optimize their utility. In unstructured P2P file sharing, nodes employ scoped flooding or multiple parallel random walks to reach other nodes and thus have to adhere to small out-degrees to prevent clogging. For analogous reasons of scalability, overlay networks also require constraints on the out-degree of nodes so as to reduce the number of links that need monitoring and to reduce the amount of link state information to be disseminated. The success of your killer application depends critically on the connectedness of the network. Every node will independently attempt to minimize its average latency to the subset of nodes of interest, but will this lead to an operating point that is close to the social optimum, or can it lead to an anarchic situation characterized by an impoverishment of connectivity?
In this paper we define and study a graph-theoretic game called the Bounded Budget Connection (BBC) game that abstracts each of the three situations above where strategic nodes acting under a cost budget form connections (friends) with a view to optimizing their proximity (influence) to the nodes of interest. This is a big problem space that allows for a variety of models to capture different situations. In addition to different notions of connection cost and proximity e.g., symmetric and asymmetric, uniform and nonuniform, metric spaces, etc., one can also consider the dynamics of the resultant complex systems. There are many earlier works that touch on similar issues as detailed in subsection 1.3. We believe the budget constraint is an important realworld restriction and consider our paper to be a preliminary step towards understanding and characterizing the rich and elegant structures that exist in this domain.
Our Results
To capture the above scenarios we posit the following Bounded Budget Connection (BBC) game: we have a col-lection of n players or nodes each of whom has a budget for purchasing links; each link has a cost as well as a length and each node has a set of preference weights for each of the remaining nodes; the objective of each node is to use its budget to buy a set of outgoing links from itself so as to minimize its sum of preference weighted distances to the remaining nodes.
Our goal in this paper is to study the structural and complexity-theoretic properties of pure Nash equilibria. We first present our results on the most general nonuniform BBC games. Nonuniform BBC games are best explained by defining their complement. Uniform BBC games are those in which all link costs are equal, all link lengths are equal, all preference weights are equal and all budgets are equal. Nonuniform BBC games are BBC games which are not uniform.
• We show that determining the existence of a pure Nash equilibrium in nonuniform BBC games is NP-hard. To be precise, we can show the NP-hardness of determining the existence of a pure Nash equilibrium when link costs, link lengths or preference weights are nonuniform. 2 Next, we present results on uniform BBC games. We can assume, without loss of generality, that all link weights, link lengths and preference weights are equal to 1 and all budgets are equal to k, thus allowing us to talk of (n, k)-uniform BBC games.
• We show that a pure Nash equilibrium or stable graph exists for all (n, k)-uniform BBC games and that all stable graphs are essentially fair (i.e. all nodes have similar costs). We provide an explicit construction of a family of stable graphs that spans the spectrum from minimum to maximum total social cost. To be precise we show that that the price of stability is Θ(1) and the price of anarchy is Ω( ¡ n/k log k n ) and O( ¡ n log k n ). Observe that our bounds for the price of anarchy are essentially tight when k is a constant.
Lastly, we consider the dynamics of best response moves.
• We show that in any (n, k)-uniform BBC game, a (suitably defined and entirely natural) best response walk converges to a strongly connected configuration within n 2 steps.
• We show that uniform BBC games are not (ordinal) potential games by presenting a loop for best response walks. This serves to underscore the importance of our explicit constructions of stable graphs, as it rules out the possibility of demonstrating existence of Nash equilibria through suitably defined potential functions.
We end by showing that there are analogous results for the case where the cost function is the maximum (instead of sum) of the weighted distances.
Related Work
Notions of group and network formation along with concepts of influence have been investigated by a number of different communities starting with researchers in economics and game theory and followed by work in combinatorial optimization and computer science. The work of [17] modeled and analyzed the stability of networks when nodes themselves choose to form or sever links; their model is different from ours in that they studied different stylized models that included production and allocation functions under the (relatively weak) concept of pairwise stability, along with side payments. [5] study a model of directed network formation where nodes incur costs based on the number of incoming links. In [13] , where they defined and studied a similar network creation game, the authors do not have a fixed budget of directed links for the nodes; instead they consider undirected links, and the nodes optimize a cost which is the sum of the number of edges, scaled by a parameter α > 0, and the sum of distances to the rest of the nodes. They present several results on the price of anarchy, which is the ratio of the cost of the worst-case Nash equilibrium to the social optimum cost [21] . Further results in this direction are obtained in [1] and [10] . [15] extends this model to the case where each node is only interested in connecting to a subset of the other nodes. [11] is similar to [13] in that they impose a cost for the purchase of a link rather than a fixed budget, however they consider a stochastic model and associated small-world effects. In [25] a variant is studied, in which the nodes are embedded in a metric space and the distance component of the cost is replaced by the stretch with respect to the metric. They obtain tight bounds on the price of anarchy and show that the problem of deciding the existence of pure Nash equilibria is NP-hard. Network formation under the requirement for bilateral consent for building links is studied in [9] . [12] focuses on a similar network creation game restricted to a bipartite graph, with nodes representing buyers and sellers. Our model follows directly in the tradition of [7, 22] where they present experimental studies of network formation games involving non-unit link lengths.
Network formation games have also been studied in the context of Internet inter-domain routing. A coalitional gametheoretic problem modeling of BGP is introduced in [27] and studied further in [24] . A fractional version is studied in [16] . Also related is the work on designing strategy-proof mechanisms for BGP [14] as well as the recent work on strategic network formation through AS-level contracts [4] . [18] consider a contracts-based model of network formation where links do not have predefined costs but are subject to negotiation and nodes attempt to minimize incoming traffic by obtaining compensation in return.
Combinatorial optimization aspects are explored in [19, 20] where the goal is to pick an initial set in a stochastic model with maximal expected influence. This model is extended further in [6] to a competitive setting within the stochastic framework where different players compete (sequentially) to maximize their expected influence.
PROBLEM DEFINITION
A Bounded Budget Connection game (henceforth, a BBC game) is specified by a tuple V, w, c, , b , where V is a set of nodes, w : A strategy for node u is a subset
. Let Su denote a strategy chosen by node u and let S = {Su : u ∈ V } denote the collection of strategies. The network formed by S is simply the directed graph
is the shortest path from u to v in G(S) according to the lengths given by . For convenience, we assume that if no path exists in G(S) from u to v, then d(u, v) is given by some large integer M n maxu,v (u, v); we refer to M as the disconnection penalty.
Following the standard game-theoretic terminology, we say that a strategy selection S = {Su : u ∈ V } is stable if it is a pure Nash equilibrium for the BBC game; in particular, for each u, Su is an optimal strategy for u assuming that the strategy for every v = u is fixed as in S.
A major focus of our work is on uniform games, in which
In a uniform game, we may assume without loss of generality that c(u, v) = w(u, v) = (u, v) = 1 for all u, v, and b(u) = k, for all u ∈ V , for some integer k. We refer to the preceding uniform game as an (n, k)-uniform game where n = |V |. We refer to BBC games that are not uniform as non-uniform games.
NONUNIFORM GAMES
In this section we show there exist instances of non-uniform BBC games that do not have a pure Nash equilbrium. Furthermore, we prove that it is NP-hard to determine whether a given instance of a non-uniform BBC game has a pure Nash equilibrium.
Nonexistence of pure Nash equilibria and NP-hardness
Theorem 1. For any n ≥ 11, k ≥ 1, there exists a nonuniform BBC game with n nodes, nonuniform preferences, uniform link costs, uniform link lengths, and a uniform budget of k for every node, such that the game has no pure Nash equilibrium.
Proof. We first construct a BBC game G with n = 11, k = 1, uniform costs, nonuniform lengths, and nonuniform preferences, such that G has no pure Nash equilibrium. We then show how to drop the nonuniformity in link lengths and also extend the claim to arbitrary values of n and k.
The basic idea is to encode the pay-off structure of a "matching pennies" game [26] . To construct such an instance we define a gadget (see Figure 1 for an illustration). Our gadget is made out of two sub-gadgets, sub-gadget(0) and sub-gadget(1). For i ∈ {0, 1}, sub-gadget(i) consists of five nodes: a central one (iC), two bottom ones (left, iLB and right, iRB), and two top ones (left, iLT and right, iRT ). We set the length of every link shown in Figure 1 to be 1, while the length of every omitted link is L, where L is chosen suitably large. We also have one additional node X (not depicted in the figure) and set the length of (0LB, X), (0RB, X), (1LB, X), and (1RB, X) to be 1 and that of all other links to X to be L.
Figure 1: Gadget -consisting of two subgadgets
Having defined the nodes and link lengths, it remains to define the preferences. (Recall that link costs are all uniform and the budget for each node is 1.) For every solid edge (u, v) in Figure 1 , we set w(u, v) to be 1. In addition, we set w(0C, 1C), and w(1C, 0C) to be 1. Finally, we set w(0LB, 0RT ), w(0RB, 0LT ), w(1LB, 1RT ), and w(1RB, 1LT ) to be 2, and w(u, X) to be 1 for each u in {0LB, 0RB, 1LB, 1RB}.
We now establish that the instance constructed has no pure Nash equilibrium. Let us consider the case when the action for node 0C is link (0C, 0LT ). Then, in a stable network, 0RB sets its link to 0C since it has a higher preference for 0LT than X, which implies that 1C sets its link to 1RT and 1RB sets its link to X. This means that 0C does not have a path to 1C in the network and will switch its link to 0RT to improve its utility. Thus, there is no pure Nash equilibrium that contains the link (0C, 0LT ). The other case with the link (0C, 1LT ) is symmetric.
We now extend the result to uniform lengths by modifying the preferences. The preferences w(u, v) where u is a top node remain the same. The "switch" from the central node v of a sub-gadget to a top node u of the same sub-gadget can be implemented by setting w(v, u) to be ζ > 0, w(v, v ) to be ξ > 0, with ξ < ζ, if v is the central node of the other gadget, and to be 0 otherwise.
Implementing the switch from a bottom node v to either the central node u of the same sub-gadget, or to node X is a little more involved.
where v denotes v's cross-over node at the top of the same sub-gadget. If M denotes the disconnection penalty we enforce the following inequalities: α > γ, α > β, and α · (M − 1) < β · (M − 1) + γ · (M − 2). The first inequality guarantees that a bottom node will never establish a direct link to its cross-over node at the top of the same sub-gadget. The second one guarantees that if the link from the central node to the cross-over does not exist, then the bottom node will connect to X. The last inequality guarantees that if the link from the central node to the cross-over node exists, the bottom node will connect to the central node. The three inequalities can be jointly satisfied by picking positives γ, such that < M −2 M −1 · γ, and setting β = γ + and α = β
This completes the proof for n = 11 and k = 1. The result easily extends to n > 11 or k ≥ 2 by just forcing all of the remaining links to connect to specific nodes, using appropriate preferences.
Theorem 2. It is NP-hard to determine whether a given instance of the non-uniform BBC game has a pure Nash equilibrium.
Proof. The proof is by a reduction from 3SAT. Let φ be a 3SAT formula with n variables and m clauses. We create a non-uniform BBC instance as follows. For each variable xi in φ, we introduce 3 nodes: a variable node Xi, and two truth nodes XiT and XiF . For each clause cj , we introduce a clause node Kj and intermediate nodes Ij1, Ij2, and Ij3, one for each of the three literals in the clause. We also have two additional nodes S and T and a gadget G consisting of the nodes illustrated in Figure 1 . Our construction is depicted in Figure 2 . For all u, v in V , we set c(u, v) to be 1. The length of every link shown in Figure 2 is 1 and the length of every other link is a large number L greater than the number of nodes; we set the disconnection penalty M to be nL. The budget for each node is 1, except for node S, which has a budget of m.
We now define the preferences and the budgets. Let V denote the set of all nodes. For each i, for all v, w(XiT , v) and w(XiF , v) are both 0; that is, the truth nodes do not need to communicate with any node in the game. We also set their budgets to 0.
For We next consider the gadget G. The preferences among the top nodes in the gadget are identical to that used in the proof of Theorem 1. We also have w(0C, 1C) and w(1C, 0C) to be 2m − 1, and w(0C, v) and w(1C, v) to be 2 for each intermediate node v. For each bottom node u in G, we set w(u, v) to be 3 if v is the cross-over top node in the subgadget, 2 is v is S, and 1 for T . The budget for each node in the gadget is 1. Finally, we consider nodes S and T . For node S, w(S, v) = 1 if v is a clause node and 0 otherwise. Node S has a budget of m and node T has a budget of 0.
We now show that φ is satisfiable if and only if the above BBC game has a pure Nash equilibrium. Suppose φ is satisfiable. Consider a satisfying assignment for φ. If xi is true, we set the link from Xi to XiT ; otherwise, we set the link from Xi to XiF ; in either case, Xi has attained its highest utility possible. The intermediate nodes just link to their respective variable nodes and attain their highest utility. For each clause cj , there exists a literal in the clause, say the kth literal, which is satisfied. If the literal equals variable xi, then the intermediate node I jk has a path to XiT through Xi. So we set the link from the clause node Cj to I jk . A clause node prefers to communicate with three of the truth nodes but can communicate with at most one in any stable network owing to budget constraints. Furthermore, the three-hop path achieved from the clause node to a truth node is the shortest possible, so each clause node has also attained its maximum utility. We finally consider the nodes in the gadget G. Each top node sets its link to the only node for which it has a preference. The two central nodes link to node S and achieve their maximum utility possible since they prefer to have paths of length 3 to m of the intermediate nodes over a path of length 3 to the other central node. Each bottom node links to the central node in its subgadget and achieves its maximum utility given the other connections. Thus, the constructed network is stable.
If the BBC game has a pure Nash equilibrium, then each of the central nodes in the gadget G has to link to S since the gadget by itself does not have a pure Nash equilibrium, by the proof of Theorem 1. This occurs only if each of the central nodes has a 3-hop path to at least m intermediate nodes. This in turn implies that each clause node has a link to an intermediate node. A clause node links to an intermediate node only if the intermediate node has a path either to a node XiT , where xi is in the clause, or to a node XiF , where xi is in the clause. This is because if no intermediate node for the clause has such a path, then the clause node would link to S. This yields the following satisfying assignment for φ: set xi to true if Xi has a link to XiT , and false otherwise.
The above reduction uses a nonuniform budget function. By using additional nodes, the reduction can be easily adapted to work where the budget of each node is k (≥ 2).
UNIFORM GAMES
Although non-uniform games lack stability, the simplest version of the framework has many interesting properties. We define a uniform (n, k)-BBC game as a game in which all preferences, costs, and lengths are 1, and each node has a budget of k links. In this graph, all the nodes are equally interested in communicating with all other nodes, any connection can be established for the same cost, and the utility function is calculated using hop counts.
We show that a Nash equilibrium exists for the uniform (n, k)-BBC game with any values of n and k and that all stable graphs are essentially fair (all nodes in a stable graphs have similar cost). We establish nearly tight bounds on the price of anarchy and price of stability. We provide some initial results about the dynamics of non-stable uniform graphs, as individual nodes keep changing their links to improve their cost.
Nash equilibria
The main result of this section is the following.
Theorem 3. For any n ≥ 2 and any positive integer k, uniform stable (n, k)-graphs exist, and in any stable graph the cost of any node is Θ(1) times the cost of any other node. The price of anarchy is Ω( √ (n/k)
The price of stability is Θ(1).
To prove Theorem 3, we first show fairness. Then we describe a class of stable graphs for any k and prove that they are stable. The graphs in this class have total cost ranging from O(n 2 log k n) to Ω(n 2 ¦ n k ). This gives a lower bound on the price of anarchy and the price of stability. Then, we give an upper bound on the diameter of any stable graph and use this to obtain an upper bound on the price of anarchy.
Lemma 1. Fairness: In any stable graph for the (n, k)uniform game, the cost of any node is at most n + n log k n more than, and at most 2 + 1/k + o(1) times, the cost of any other node.
Proof. Let G be a stable graph for the (n, k)-uniform game and let r be a node in G that has the smallest cost C * . Consider the shortest path tree T rooted at r. Let v be any other node. Within log k n hops from v, there exists a node u that has at least one edge not in T . Since G is stable, node u has cost at most C * + n, since it can achieve this cost by attaching one of its links not in T to r. Therefore, the cost of v is at most C * +n+n log k n, since the distance from v to any node w is at most log k n more than that of u to w. Noting that C * is at least § 0≤i<log k n ik i ≥ (n − n/k) log k n completes the proof of the lemma.
In order to give an upper bound on the price of anarchy and the price of stability, we define a class of graphs that is stable. We call this class the "Forest of Willows" graphs (see Figure 3 ). Definition 1. Forest of Willows graphs: There are k directed, complete, k-ary trees of height h (rooted at nodes r1, r2, . . . , r k ). Each of these trees has k h leaves. Beneath each leaf, there is a tail of length l (l nodes not including the leaf ). Let Ri be the nodes in the tree rooted at ri plus the tails beneath this tree. The last node in each tail has an edge to the root of each of the k trees. The second to last node of a tail in Ri has an edge to each rj, j = i. If a tail node in Ri does not have an edge to ri, the node above it has an edge to ri and any k − 2 other roots. If a tail node in Ri does have an edge to ri, the node above it has an edge to each rj , j = i. We call this the initial configuration. This graph has n nodes, where n = k * (2 h+1 − 1 + 2 h l). This can be extended to other values of n by adding additional leaves as evenly as possible across the trees. However, for the sake of simplicity, the following proof of stability assumes that n is of the above form. Under each leaf, there is a tail of length l. The last node in each tail has an edge to the root of each tree. The second to last node of a tail has an edge to the root of each tree other than its own. The rest of the tail nodes alternate between pointing to all the roots except their own or all the roots except one (arbitrary, but not its own).
We restrict h and l by requiring:
(h + l) 2 4 + h + 2l + 1 < n k By definition of the graph structure, h ∈ O(log k n). Any l(0 ≤ l < 2¨n k ) obey the requirements. Notice that l < 2¨n k implies h > log 2 n 2 − log 2 k 2 − 1. Also notice that the diameter of this graph is Θ(h + l), so as k approaches n log 2 n , this class converges to a single graph: a collection of k complete k-ary trees with edges from the leaves to the roots.
For ease of notation, we use descendants of x for a node x ∈ Ri to refer to x plus all nodes y ∈ Ri such that x is on the unique shortest path from ri to y. We use Dx to refer to the number of descendants of x. Ancestors of x for x ∈ Ri refer to all the nodes in the shortest path from ri to x (not including x). We use δx to refer to the number of ancestors of x (which is the same as the number of hops from ri to x. When x is clear from the context, we use D and δ instead of Dx and δx.
Since any node that is δ hops below some ri is symmetric to any other node δ hops below any rj, we only need to consider whether nodes in a single Ri (say R1) would move any edges. None of the edges that make up the trees or the tails will be moved, or else the graph would become disconnected. So we only need to consider edges from leaf nodes or tail nodes to roots (call these non-essential edges).
With this symmetry in mind, we must verify that no node in R1 will move any of its links. First, we show for that any node u in Rj, the number of hops from rj to u times the number of descendants of u is smaller than the number of nodes in Rj that are not descendants of u. Intuitively, this is like isolating a single potential link end point: if a node were to move one of its links from rj to u, the decrease to its cost would be smaller than the increase to its cost, even if the distance to each node only increased by one hop. Next, we show that a node would never move its links to one of its own ancestors or descendants, and a node would never place multiple links that have an ancestor/descendant relationship to each other. Once we've eliminated the possibility of related links, it is a relatively small step using our initial lemma to show that no node would ever place its links on non-root nodes. Finally, we show that the nodes would not move their links between roots, completing the proof that Forest of Willows graphs are stable.
The following lemma is used throughout this proof.
Lemma 2. Let u be a given node in R1. If δu > 1, then n k − Du − l ≥ Duδu. If δu = 1, then n k − Du ≥ Du. Proof. Case 1: u is a tree node (so 1 ≤ δ ≤ h). Here, regardless of the values of h and l: If δ > 1:
The second derivative with respect to δ is positive, so we only need to check this at the point where d dδ = 0 (a minima).
− h − 2l − 1 > 0 by our restrictions on h and l.
Lemma 3. If node x ∈ R1 benefits by moving any of its non-essential edges to one of its descendants, and if u1 is the closest such descendant, then x will also benefit by moving this edge to another node (distinct from u1) that is δu 1 hops from a root.
Proof. Suppose x placed at least one of its non-essential edges at node u1, a descendant of x. Suppose the k −2 other non-essential edges were placed at nodes u2, u3, . . . u k−1 , and if any other uj is also a descendant of x, then δu j > δu 1 .
The total decrease in hop count by moving the edges from our original placement is at most © k−2 j=1 (Du j δu j ) − Du 1 δx (since the sum counts all of the descendants of u1 as having a decrease of δu 1 , but they actually only decreased by δu 1 −δx).
The total increase in hop count is at least (k−1)n k − © k−1 j=2 (Du j ) − Dx (since each of these non-essential edges used to point to a root, and the distance to all the descendants of these roots that are not also descendants of x or one of the uj will now increase by at least one hop.) By moving to another node δu 1 hops below a root (that is not an ancestor or descendant of x or of any of the other uj ), the total decrease in hop count will increase by at least Du 1 δx. Meanwhile, the increase in hop count can only get lower. Therefore, if x would make the previous move, x would also make the new move.
The proofs of Lemma 4 and Lemma 5 are similar to the proof of Lemma 3, and have therefore been omitted.
Lemma 4. If node x ∈ R1 benefits by moving any of its non-essential edges to one of its ancestors, u1 (u1 = r1), then x will also benefit by moving this edge to another node δu 1 hops from a root. 3 Lemma 5. If x will benefit by moving any two of its nonessential edges to nodes, {u1, u2} ∈ R1, such that u1 is an ancestor of u2, then it will also benefit by moving to a node δu 1 hops below r1 and a node δu 2 hops below r1 (neither of which is an ancestor or descendant of x or of any other uj ). Lemma 6. Forest of Willows graphs are stable. Proof. Consider any possible selections of non-essential edges for a node x ∈ R1. Suppose t of these, {u1, u2, . . . , ut}, are moved away from the roots they point to in the initial configuration (to nodes at least one hop below a root). Also assume that no ui is an ancestor or descendant of x or of any other uj (we can make this assumption because of Lemma 3, Lemma 4, and Lemma 5). Then, some nodes in each of t trees will get at least one hop further away from x. Du i nodes will get δu i hops closer (for all ui). Dx(≤ l) nodes will stay the same distance. The change in total hop count, ∆, is at least the total increase minus the total decrease.
by Lemma 2
When δu i = 1 for all i, we must consider two cases. Case 1: x ∈ R1 does not have an edge to r1 in the initial configuration (or does not move this edge). In this case, the total increase is at least nt k − t i=1 Du i . (The −l is not there, because x is not located under a root that increases.) This gives a change in total hop count ≥ nt k − t i=1 Du i (δu i +1) > 0 (by the δ = 1 condition in Lemma 2). Case 2:
x ∈ R1 has an edge to r1 in the initial configuration and moves this edge. All of the nodes ui are 1 hop below roots, and none is an ancestor of x. There is a single node, u1, that is 1 hop from r1 that is an ancestor of x: the distance to each of the descendants of u1 that are not also descendants of x (at least Du 1 + 1 − l nodes) will increase by at least 2 hops (x cannot be the second to last node in a tail because it had an edge to r1. If x is the last node of a tail, then the new distance to r1 is at least h − 1. If x is at least 2 hops from the end of a tail, then there are at least 2 hops to the closest node pointing to r1).
Therefore, the total increase in trees other than R1 is at least n(t−1)
Du i , and the increase in R1 is at least 2(Du 1 + 1 − l). This gives the following total change in hop count, ∆.
≥ 0 by Lemma 2 and the fact that Du 1 includes at least 3 tails (when δu 1 = 1) as long as k > 1 and h ≥ 3.
Therefore, x does not have incentive to move any of its non-essential edges to nodes other than roots.
Finally, we must verify that x has no incentive to move an edge from one root to another. Case 1: x ∈ R1 has edges to all roots except r1 in the initial configuration.
In this case, consider what would happen if x moved an edge from some root rj to r1. The distance to descendants of r1 but not of x would decrease by at most 1 hop, since the node beneath x in the tail already has an edge to r1. This is a decrease of at most n k − 2 (x has only k − 1 non-essential edges, so at least x and one node below it keep the same distance). Meanwhile, the distance to all the descendants of rj will increase by at least one hop. This gives an increase of at least n k . Since the increase is always larger than the decrease, there is no incentive for this move.
Case 2:
x ∈ R1 has edges to all roots except some rj (j = 1) in the initial configuration.
In this case, first consider what would happen if x moved an edge from r1 to rj. The distance to descendants of r1 but not of x (at least n k − l nodes) would increase by at least 2, since it is 2 hops to another node with an edge to r1. So there is an increase of at least 2n k − 2l. The distance to the n k descendants of rj would decrease by 1 hop, since the node beneath x already points to rj. So the decrease is at most n k . The increase is always larger than the decrease, so there is no incentive for this move.
Next consider what would happen if x moved an edge from some rg = r1 to rj. The distance to the n k descendants of rg would increase by 1 hop, while the distance to the n k descendants of rj would decrease by 1 hop. Therefore, this move does not make any difference to x, so x has no incentive to move.
Lemma 6 showed us that Forest of Willows graphs are examples of Nash equilibria. However, in order to describe the price of anarchy and the price of stability (to complete the proof of Theorem 3), we must also bound the utility for any stable graph.
Lemma 7. The diameter of any uniform stable (n, k)-graph (k ≥ 2) is O( n log k n), and there is at least one node whose distance to any other node is O( √ n).
Proof. Let G be a stable graph for the (n, k)-uniform game, and let ∆ denote the diameter of G, given by a path from a node r to a node v. Consider a shortest path tree from r; so the depth of this tree is ∆ and v is a leaf of T . Let P denote the set of nodes on the path from r to v in T , not counting r; so |P | = ∆. Let C be the sum of distances from r to the n − ∆ nodes not in P . The sum of distances from r to the ∆ nodes in P is exactly ∆(∆ + 1)/2. So the cost of r is C + ∆(∆ + 1)/2.
The cost of v is at most C + n − ∆/2 + ∆(∆/2 + 1)/4 + ∆(∆/2 + 1)/4 since v can use one of its at least two edges to connect to r and the other to connect to a node halfway along the path from r to v. Simplifying, we obtain that the cost of v is at most C + n + ∆ 2 /4. By Lemma 1, the cost of v is at least C + ∆(∆ + 1)/2 − n − n log k n. We thus obtain the inequality: C + n + ∆ 2 /4 ≥ C + ∆(∆ + 1)/2 − n − n log k n, yielding ∆ = O( n log k n + 2n). Using the fact that the cost of v is at least C (in place of the reference to Lemma 1) in the above proof gives the second part of the lemma.
Proof of Theorem 3: The first claim directly follows from Lemma 1. In any graph with max degree k, every node must have cost at least Ω(n log k n). Forest of Willows graphs with l = 0 have total cost per node O(n log k n). Therefore, the price of stability is Θ(1).
If l = 0, a Forest of Willows graph has total cost per node = O(n log k n). Therefore, the social utility has total cost (over all nodes) O(n 2 log k n). If l = Ω( n k ), the total cost (over all nodes) is Ω(n 2 n k ). Therefore, the price of anarchy is Ω( √ (n/k) log k n ). Finally, Lemma 7 implies that the total cost of any node in the worst Nash equilibrium cannot be higher than O( n log k n), so the total cost is O(n n log k n). We already know that the social equilibrium is at least O(n log k n). Therefore, the price of anarchy is O( n log k n ).
Dynamics of best response walks
Given the existence of pure Nash equilibria for (n, k)uniform games, it is natural to ask whether an equilibrium can be obtained by a sequence of local links changes. In particular, we consider a specific type of best response walk: in each step, a node tests for its stability and, if it is not stable, moves its links to the set of nodes that optimize its cost. We assume for convenience that only one node attempts to change its links in any step of the best response walk.
We first show that, starting from any initial state, the best response walk converges to a strongly connected graph in O(n 2 ) steps, as long as every node is allowed to execute a best response step once every n steps. Furthermore, there exists an initial state such that a best response walk takes Ω(n 2 ) steps to converge to strong connectivity. We next study convergence to stability and show that there exists an initial state from which a particular best response walk does not converge to a stable graph. This means that the (n, k)-uniform game is not an ordinal potential game, a characteristic which justifies our use of a constructive proof for the existence of Nash equilibria.
Convergence to a strongly connected graph. For a given node u, we define the reach of u to be the number of nodes to which it has paths. Since the cost of disconnection is assumed to be M > n, when we execute a best-response step for a node u, the reach of u cannot decrease.
Lemma 8. Suppose the graph G is not strongly connected, and a node u changes its edges according to a best response step. Then, after the step, the reach of any node other than u either remains the same or is at least the new reach of u.
Proof. If a node v has a path to u, then the reach of v is at least the reach of u after the best response step. Otherwise, the reach of v does not change.
The above lemma indicates that whenever a best response step causes a change, the vector that consists of all the reach values in increasing order becomes lexicographically larger. In order to show convergence, we need to argue progress. We will do so by showing that whenever the graph is not strongly connected, there exists a node that can improve its reach. In fact, we use a stronger property that allows us to bound the convergence time.
Consider best response walks that operate in a roundrobin manner. In each round, each node (one at a time in an arbitrary order) executes a best response step. The order may vary from round to round. Let Gr refer to the graph before round r.
Lemma 9. If Gr is not strongly connected at the start of round r, then the minimum reach increases by at least one during the round.
Proof. Consider the strongly connected components of the given graph Gr. Consider the component graph CG in which we have a vertex for each strongly connected component and edge between two components whenever there is an edge from a vertex in one component to the other. This graph is a dag. Let m denote the minimum reach in Gr. By Lemma 8, nodes with reach greater than m will continue to have reach greater than m. So we only need to consider nodes with reach m. All of these nodes lie in sink components.
Consider any sink component C. We first argue that there exists a node in C that can improve its reach by executing a best response step. Consider a vertex u in C that has an edge from a vertex v in another component. Let w be a vertex in the sink component that has an edge to u. All of u, v, and w exist by definition of strongly connected components (and our assumption that the out-degree of every vertex is at least 1). If w replaces the edge (w, u) with (w, v), it can reach all vertices in the sink component as well as the component containing v. The argument for the latter set is clear; for the former set, note that all we have done is "replace" the direct edge (w, u) by the two-hop path w → u → v.
For any sink component C, let v be the first node in C in the round order that improves its reach through a best response step. Note that v exists by the argument of the preceding paragraph. Furthermore, in the step prior to v's best response, the reach of every node in C is m. After v's best response, the reach of v increases to at least m + 1, as does that of every node in C, since they each have a path to v. By Lemma 8, after every subsequent step, the reach of any node in C is at least m + 1. Therefore, it follows that at the end of the round, the reach of every node in a sink component of CG increases; hence, the minimum reach increases, completing the proof of the lemma.
Theorem 4. The best response walk converges to a strongly connected graph in n 2 steps.
Proof. By Lemma 9, the minimum reach increases by at least one. Since the initial reach is 1 and the maximum reach is n, the number of steps for the best response walk to converge to a strongly connected graph is at most n 2 .
The above theorem is essentially tight. In the following scenario (with k = 1), a best response walk may take Ω(n 2 ) steps to converge to a strongly connected graph. Consider a graph G of n = r + p nodes that is a directed ring over r ≥ n/2 nodes together with a directed path of p = n − r nodes that ends at one of the nodes in the ring. Suppose a round begins at the tail T of the directed path, which can reach all nodes, proceeds along the path and then along the ring in the direction of the ring. The p nodes on the path cannot improve their reach. Furthermore, the first r − p nodes on the ring (in round-robin order) also cannot improve their reach in a best response step. The (r−p+1)st node can improve its reach by connecting to T , yielding a new graph G that is a directed ring over r + 1 nodes and a directed path of n − r nodes. If we repeat this process, the number of steps to converge is Ω(n 2 ).
Cycles in best response walks. Unlike strong connectivity, convergence to a pure Nash equilibrium is not guaran-teed. In the following simple example, a round-robin bestresponse walk contains loops. This simple example is a (7,2)uniform game. Suppose our nodes are numbered 0, 1, . . . , 6. We start with directed edges (0,1), (0,4), (1, 2) , (1, 6) , (2,3), (2, 5) , (3, 0) , (3, 6) , (4, 3) , (4, 6) , (5, 4) , (5, 1) , (6, 5) , (6, 2) . This configuration gives nodes 0,4,5 and 6 each a cost of 11. Node 1 has cost 12. Nodes 2 and 3 each have cost 10. Now consider the following best response walk. Node 6 moves its edges to (6,0) and (6, 2) . Node 3 moves its edges to (3, 5) and (3, 6) . Node 2 moves its edges to (2,0) and (2, 3) . Node 6 moves its edges to (6, 2) and (6, 5) . Node 3 moves its edges to (3, 0) and (3, 0) . Node 2 moves its edges to (2, 3) and (2, 5) , returning us to the original configuration, thus completing a loop.
The above example of a loop in the best response walk shows that the uniform-(n, k)-game is not an ordinate potential game. However, the loop does not rule out the possibility that either (a) a well-chosen best response walk converges from any initial state, or (b) certain best response walks do converge to stability if started from simple initial configurations such as the empty graph.
We have observed experimentally that best response walks in which a node with the maximum cost always makes the next best response step do not always converge to a stable graph. However, based on our experimental data, this best response walk starting from an empty graph does seem to converge to a stable graph. Our experiments also suggest that there may be some exponentially long best-response paths that start in some non-empty initial configuration and end at a stable graph.
MAX DISTANCE UTILITY FUNCTION
In the BBC games we have studied thus far, the utility of a node u in G(S) given by − v w(u, v)d(u, v), where d(u, v) is the shortest path from u to v in G(S) according to the lengths given by . We have also considered a natural variant of the utility function: the utility of u is − maxv w(u, v)d(u, v). In order to make it clear that we are using a different cost function, we will call the max distance version BBC-max games.
As with the previous cost function, we show there exist instances of the general BBC-max game that have no Nash equilibrium. If we restrict ourselves to the uniform version (uniform (n, k)-BBC-max game), there is a stable graph for any n and k < n. It turns out that ratio between the total utility achieved in a Nash equilibrium in a uniform BBC-max game and the social optimum could be much worse than in BBC games. In particular, we establish a lower bound of Ω( n k log k n ) on the price of anarchy in BBC-max games.
Theorem 5. For all n ≥ 16, k ≥ 1, there exists a nonuniform BBC-max game with n nodes, uniform link costs, uniform link lengths, and a uniform budget of k for every node, such that the game has no pure Nash equilibrium. Furthermore, it is NP-hard to determine whether a given nonuniform BBC-max game instance is a Nash equilibrium.
This can be proved with a slight modification to the gadget of Figure 1 , in which 0LT is linked to the "sink" node 0S, the sink is linked to two new nodes, the second of which connects to 0C (plus similar additions to gadget1). Theorem 6. The price of anarchy for uniform (n, k) BBCmax games is Ω( n k log k n ), O( n log k n ).
Proof. Consider the following graph for k > 2. There are 2k − 1 tails, {t1, t2, . . . , t 2k−1 }, each of length l = n−1 2k−1 . There is also one "root" node r with edges to the top node in t1, t2, . . . , t k . For ease of notation, we will define segments S1 = {r, t1, t2, . . . , t k }, S2 = {t k+1 }, S2 = {t k+2 }, . . . , S k = {t 2k−1 }, with the head of each segment Si (i > 1) = the first node of the tail, and the head of S1 = r. The last node of each tail points to the head of each segment. The rest of the nodes in each tail point to r and to the last node of a tail. The location of the rest of the edges don't matter. See Figure 4 . Figure 4 : A high cost Nash equilibrium for the max distance cost function: 2k − 1 paths, one node points to k of them. Each node at the end of a path points to the start of the first k − 1 paths and the extra node. Each node in a path points to the node at the end of the path and to the extra node. The rest of the edge don't matter.
It is easy to verify that this is a Nash equilibrium. This example can be extended to the case where k = 2 with a small adjustment. In this case, there are 3 paths plus one node that points to the head of two of the paths. The nodes at the end of each path point to the root of the single path and the extra node. The second to last nodes in the other paths point to the extra node. The rest of the nodes in the other paths point to the end of a tail.
In the Forest of Willows graphs described in Section 4.1, when l = 0 the sum of the max distances = O(n log k n). Therefore, the social optimum cost is at most O(n log k n). We have just shown that there is a graph with the sum of the max distances = Ω( n 2 k ). Therefore, the Price of Anarchy is Ω( n k log k n ). The max distance between any two nodes in any stable graph is at most n, so the sum of the max distances in any stable graph is at most n 2 . The diameter of a stable graph must be at least log k n. Therefore, the price of anarchy is O( n log k n ), and our bounds are essentially tight when k is constant.
Theorem 7. The price of stability for uniform (n, k) BBCmax games is Θ(1).
Proof. It is easy to verify that the Forest of Willows graphs with l = 0 (described in section 4.1) are also stable under the max cost function. Obviously, no node can have max distance less than log k n. Therefore, the social optimum is at most O(n log k n), and the best Nash is at least Ω(n log k n), so Price of Stability is Θ(1).
CONCLUDING REMARKS
In this paper, we introduced a new variant of the network creation game, applicable to social networks in which users have limited time and resources to spend creating connections, and to overlay or peer-to-peer networks where each node has only enough bandwidth to connect to a limited number of other nodes. We showed that when different users or nodes have different preferences, or when the distances or costs between users vary, there may be no stable state. However, when all users are identical, there is an equilibrium for any number of users and any number of links per user. In the uniform version, we have given essentially tight bounds on the price of anarchy and the price of stability. In the full paper [23] , we also show that no regular graph -a graph in which all nodes imitate the same configuration of links -can ever be stable. This has implications for overlay networks; although it would be natural to consider a symmetric configuration, selfish nodes would not be satisfied. Also in [23] , we present a fractional version of the BBC game, in which nodes may fractionally divide their budget of links across multiple other nodes. A node's cost is the sum over all other nodes of the cost of a unit minimum cost flow to that other node. We show that this fractional version of the BBC game always has a pure Nash equilibrium.
